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Engaging English Speaking Facebook Users in an Anti-ISIS
Awareness Campaign
Abstract
This article reports on The International Center for Study of Violent Extremism (ICSVE’s)
small-scale Facebook ad awareness campaigns ran between December 7, 2017 and
December 31, 2017 in the United States, UK, Canada, and Australia. Two ICSVE-produced
videos were used, namely The Promises of ad-Dawlah to Women, featuring the testimony of
a Belgian female ISIS defector, and Today is the Female Slave Market in ad-Dawlah,
featuring a Syrian male ISIS defector who witnessed the sexual enslavement of women by
ISIS. The purpose of the campaign was to reach as many English-speaking individuals in
U.S., UK, Canada, and Australia to drive engagement with the ICSVE-produced videos as
well raise awareness about the dangers of joining or considering joining a violent extremist
group like ISIS. The ad generated a reach of over 1 million and almost 604K video views. In
addition to important engagement and awareness metrics, the qualitative impact analysis
of generated comments was promising in terms of initiating important discussions on the
dangers emanating from violent extremist groups like ISIS.
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INTRODUCTION
Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS/Daesh) became known for its
unprecedented social media drive and recruitment on a twenty-four basis.
Many of the thousands of the individuals from over 110 countries who
joined the conflict zones in Iraq and Syria were recruited over social media
networks and platforms. Despite losing its territory in Iraq, including much
of Syria, the group continues to inspire homegrown and returnee foreign
fighter attacks in the West and elsewhere. Its online propaganda on social
media platforms, such as Facebook, WhatsApp, and Twitter, despite
takedown policies, continues unabated, now using fleeting profiles but still
successfully swarming those who show interest in the conflicts in Iraq and
Syria (and beyond) and the jihadist cause with ISIS-related propaganda
. In our interviews with a sample of over 100 ISIS defectors, prisoners,
and returnees, we have learned about ISIS’ strong media presence
especially on Facebook, namely the presence of recruiters, ideologues,
and ISIS-produced propaganda videos that continues even today, despite
monitoring and takedown policies.
Western countries continue to be targets of high-end and high-volume
ISIS-produced propaganda materials. Since the beginning of the Syrian
conflict in 2012, 160 individuals in the United States were charged for
ISIS-related terrorism offenses. A 2015 Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI) report indicated the actual or attempted recruitment of over 200
individuals residing in the United States since the onset of the Syrian
conflict in 2011. The authors’ research indicates the prevalence of social
media-based, as opposed to face-to-face, recruitment of individuals
residing in the United States. Moreover, the most vulnerable to ISIS
recruitment and seduction over the internet are U.S. male citizens,
ages 18-20, though the most evidence suggests minor travelers as well.
Evidence in UK, Canada, and Australia also suggests the vulnerability of
young men and women to ISIS propaganda and recruitment.
This article reports on seven International Center for the Study of Violent
Extremism (ICSVE) produced Facebook ad awareness campaigns that ran
between December 7, 2017 and December 31, 2017. Two of the ICSVEproduced videos, The Promises of ad-Dawlah to Women and Today is the
Female Slave Market in ad-Dawlah were used in the campaign. The former
features the testimony of a Belgian female ISIS defector who had taken
her young son to live in ISIS territory whereas the latter a Syrian male ISIS
defector who witnessed the sexual enslavement of women by ISIS. The
purpose of these awareness campaigns was to reach as many Englishspeaking individuals in the United States, UK, Canada, and Australia (ages
13-50 in the U.S., Australia, UK, and Canada; 18 and over for the Slave
https://doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.11.3.1679
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Market video) to drive engagement with the ICSVE-produced counternarrative videos and raise awareness about the dangers of joining or
considering joining a violent extremist group like ISIS. Two ads (one for
each video) were used in every region, except for Australia, where we ran
only one ad. In total, these Facebook ads generated a reach of 1,048,133
with 604K video views, which are further discussed in the ensuing
sections.

CAMPAIGN TYPE
Awareness campaigns have historically been initiated to raise awareness
about domestic abuse, depression, alcohol abuse, gender-based violence,
and HIV prevention. They are used to 1) promote a cause, 2) raise
awareness or knowledge about a pressing social issue, and 3) reach and
target a specific audience to deliver a message that is specific, unique,
and pertinent to the target group. Awareness campaigns are especially
powerful if used for early detection and intervention. In other words, they
are especially powerful if the goal is to explain what can be gained by
changing a specific behavior as well as what can be lost by not doing so.
In the realm of counter-terrorism and Countering Violent Extremism
(CVE), awareness campaigns (for example, community, youth, and
internet-based) are crucial to understanding how individuals may
become radicalized and mobilized to violence. A U.S. Department of
State led initiative, Peer2Peer (P2P), represents a series of examples
of CVE awareness campaigns. In addition to raising awareness about
violent extremism, the P2P initiative also serves as an important platform
to discuss issues related to CVE. Similarly, Quilliam, a UK-based CVE
organization, launched #NotAnotherBrother and # NousSommesUnis
awareness campaigns to fight the appeal of violent extremism. The
latter campaign involved the release of a short counter-narrative video
in the immediate aftermath of the November 2015 Paris attacks to
raise awareness about violent extremism and highlight the need for
unity between the West and Muslims, whereas the former the use of a
counter-narrative video released on YouTube to counter ISIS and other
violent extremist groups’ social media recruitment. In December 2017,
the International Center for the Study of Violent extremism researchers
launched a Facebook ad awareness campaign targeting Iraq, where
Facebook remains the most widely used social media platform. The
campaign led to 1.7 million views and hundreds of comments related
to ISIS and counter-narrative message and strategy. Moreover, a group
of former extremists created “Abdullah X,” an online Muslim cartoon
character who was initially attracted to violent extremist rhetoric
Journal of Strategic Security
© 2018
ISSN: 1944-0464
eISSN: 1944-0472

https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol11/iss3/4
DOI: https://doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.11.3.1679

53

Speckhard et al.: Engaging English Speaking Facebook Users
Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 11, No. 3

espoused by groups like ISIS. The awareness campaign specifically
targeted young and disillusioned Muslims who might be attracted to
violent extremist messages. Our concurrent brand awareness campaigns
initiated in other parts of the world. We considered the potential of our
target audience (U.S., UK, Canada, and Australia) to come into online
contact and be influenced by terrorist groups like ISIS and the level of
exposure to environments that are supportive of extremist ideologies
and facilitate recruitment into terrorist organizations. Strictly speaking,
in the context of the first category, the authors have documented cases
of individuals from the West and Western Balkans whose radicalization
was deeply augmented, and in some cases entirely supported, by their
exposure to terrorist content via the internet. While the majority of
Westerners are not at a high level of exposure to environments that are
supportive of terrorist ideologies, there have been increasing political
tensions and social divides between Muslims and non-Muslims since the
emergence of ISIS. This creates hotbeds of discontent. This may also
facilitate recruitment. As learned during our Breaking the ISIS Brand
interviews, we also considered processes by which individuals come
to embrace violence, namely from simple online search to seduction
involving both online and face-to-face persuasion to engaging in violence
(See diagram below). This is not to suggest, however, that the process
of grooming potential recruits online should be attributed solely to
ISIS. In line with selective exposure theory, individuals, which could also
be applied in the case of ISIS supporters and sympathizers, are likely
to seek information that is aligned with their core values and beliefs.
Selective exposure in social media platforms and networks can also lead
to “audience enclaves,” or when individuals with deeply held convictions
separate themselves from offline communities and condition the behavior
of their respective community. This could also increase the likelihood for
online recruitment.
Figure 1. The process by which Individuals [Often] Come to Embrace
Extremist Content Online.
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While terrorist groups in the past have relied on traditional mass media
to spread their message and garner support, ISIS’ communication
strategy differed in that it made use of the internet and social media to
not only spread its message and garner support, but also to proselytize
its followers. In discussing the relationship between social media and
violent extremism, researchers have stressed the need to look at both
the role of social media in facilitating spread of propaganda, support,
and sympathy for ISIS and the effectiveness of social media, meaning the
use of social media by violent extremist groups, in recruiting individuals
online. For instance, some authors found a direct relationship between
anti-Muslim rhetoric in Europe and the support and sympathy for ISIS on
Twitter. Moreover, to build support, ISIS’ social media strategy focused
not only on influencing its followers but also its rivals and journalists.
Research indicates that popular social media platforms and networking
sites increase ISIS’ reach and recruitment prospects, compared to “dark
web” sites, for example, given the wide use of such platforms and the
scale of extremist content consumption by users. Arguably, social media
communication does play a significant role in providing support for
violent extremism, though one must also consider different forms of
online behaviors and offline events that can influence support for violent
extremism.
Compared to our recent Facebook studies focused on reaching audiences
that were already highly supportive of ISIS ideology and have progressed
further in the grooming process, in this campaign consideration was
given to individuals 13 and over who might be engaged with, or simply
be exposed to, for the first time to extremist narratives online. This is
crucial, as in the process, they may continue down the path of sustained
engagement and exposure to violent narratives propagated by terrorist
groups like ISIS. As ICSVE research indicates, it is on such platforms
that they are likely to develop and form ideas. More importantly, it is on
such platforms that they are likely to strike up relationships with terrorist
recruiters who could lure them further along the terrorist pathway. Both
prospects increase their susceptibility to violent ideologies and narratives,
particularly in the wake of increasing tensions surrounding the conflicts in
Iraq and Syria and/or Syrian/Iraqi conflicts in the West.
Lastly, although we assume that the majority among the targeted age
group in this campaign do not favor extremist narratives or would
succumb to such narratives, the campaign serves as an invaluable
opportunity for such protected target groups to access resources that
openly target terrorist groups like ISIS. They can also use these invaluable
resources to protect their more vulnerable peers. Given the easy sharing
Journal of Strategic Security
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and distribution mechanisms available on social media, they can also
use them to use to educate and target those who might be vulnerable
to such extremist narratives. Our hope was that by increasing awareness
of dangers of joining ISIS and similar terrorist groups in this population,
such efforts would lead to relevant discussions on the topic. We also
hoped to observe changes in attitude that we would be able to measure in
comments, as well as to changes in offline, real world behaviors, which are
beyond our ability to measure using Facebook data alone.
We chose demographic targeting based on location, age, and gender. We
further narrowed our audience by interest categories that may indicate
engagement with groups such as ISIS such as: Al-Hijrah, Salaf, Caliphate,
Mosul, Fiqh, Sharia, Ar-Raqqah, Hizb ut-Tahrir, Al-Aqsa Mosque, Hijrah
(Islam), Martyr, and Salafi movement. Ages targeted were set to 13-50
years old in the US, Australia, and Canada. In the UK, ages were set slightly
older, at 18-50 for the Promises video and simply 18 and over for the Slave
Market video.
Awareness metrics (reach, impressions, frequency, video views, and video
retention), engagement metrics (clicks, likes, shares, and comments), and
impact metrics (indicators of behavioral changes, metrics supportive of
our ad, and comments) were applied as quantitative measures to analyze
the data and comments were analyzed qualitatively to measure impacts of
the awareness campaign.

METHODOLOGY
Awareness, engagement, and impact metrics were applied to analyze
the data. The campaign evaluation was rooted in both quantitative and
qualitative metrics and standards already established by industry best
practices and the authors’ research in conducting targeted interventions
on social media platforms (See Table 1).
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Table 1
AWARENESS (QUANTITATIVE)—The total number of individuals viewing the
content. This also includes demographic data on target audience
•

“Reach” on Facebook and “Impressions” data on social media platforms

•

Reach—number among the target audience who receive the impression of
counternarratives on account screens.

•

Impression frequency—the number of times target audience members
access or see the counternarrative within a certain time.

•

Video views—the number of times our counternarratives were watched or
played.

•

Viewer retention rate—Length (or percentage) of the video watched.
Important at revealing at what point in the video a viewer’s attention might
have been lost.

ENGAGEMENT (QUANTITATIVE)—Volume and types of interaction with the
counternarrative materials
•

The number of times the video content shared

•

Video specific engagements
o

•

Viewer retention rate

Number of comments, link clicks, video “likes,” page “likes.”

COMMENTS (QUALITATIVE)—A form of engagement providing a clearer indication
on how viewers responding to the counter-narratives.
o

Supportive—comments in support of the video, characters
featured in the video or the campaign in general.

o

Negative—comments expressing dislike towards the video,
characters featured in the video or the campaign in general.

o

Misunderstood—comments (likely expressing negativity) due to
misunderstanding content featured in the video.

o

Unrelated—comments that are unrelated to the video content,
characters featured in the video, or the campaign in general.
Spam content included as well.

IMPACT ANALYSIS—A measurable change in the target audience’s behavior,
knowledge, and attitude that could be directly linked to the online intervention. This
could be measured via both qualitative and quantitative methods, namely:
•

Comments

•

Sustained engagements (for example, a user making more than one comment, an
individual directly reaching the organization, and seeking direct treatment).

•

Sustained engagement further divided into:
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Sustained constructive engagement (for example, a user commenting
positively more than once to the video content, character featured in
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thinking.
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negatively or dismissing the content of the video the campaigners. It can
be interpreted as raising doubts in the viewers’ mind.
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AWARENESS METRICS
Geographic Location and Demographic Data
Geographic Location
Campaigns targeted predominantly English-speaking regions. The United
States, The United Kingdom, and Canada all received two campaigns –
one for each video. Australia received one campaign for the Today is the
Female Slave Market in ad-Dawlah video. The United Kingdom received
slightly more specific targeting, specifically in Birmingham, Bradford,
Leeds, London, and Manchester, primarily due to existing and potential
spread of extremism in these areas. Cardiff was targeted in Wales for the
same reasons.
Demographic Information
Across regions, 25-34-year-olds were the most reached group at 35
percent, followed by 18-24-year-olds at 28 percent and 35-44-yearolds at 22 percent. The International Center for the Study of Violent
Extremism’s (ICSVE) goal was to influence young adults primarily since
they are the most vulnerable to ISIS recruitment, which is in line with the
campaign goals. At the tail ends of the age spectrum, people aged 45
and over made up 11 percent of overall reach, and 13-17-year-olds made
up 4 percent. Interestingly, even though 13-17-year-olds made up only 4
percent overall, they made up 18 percent of the reach specific to Australia.
Other ads, which included that age group, only had them make up less
than 2 – 4 percent, so the Australia campaign was unique in its greater
ability to connect with minors.
Video Views as of 03/22/2018
The ICSVE Facebook ads campaigns generated a reach of 1,048,133, with
604K video views. As we continue to experiment with these interventions
in the future, we hope to further expand our reach, hone in our internet
targeting, and increase the interest of our target audience, specifically
among those who may be willing to act as influencers and magnify our
impact. We also hope to reach to individuals that are more vulnerable
and redirect them to our newly created website to engage in further
discussion forums, watch additional videos, or gain access to other CVErelated resources and materials. This could serve to further expand and
strengthen the line of communication with them and lead to greater
prevention and intervention efforts. We will also attempt to generate
https://doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.11.3.1679
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enticing leads from those among those who believe in, are convinced of
our work, and wish to help in the fight against ISIS.
Today is the Female Slave Market in ad-Dawlah Total Views: 454K
Promises of ad-Dawlah to Women Total Views: 150K
Views include both videos that play due to the Facebook auto-play
feature as well as due to clicks. In practice, given that Facebook videos
often play automatically coupled with the fact that Facebook counts a
view as any video watched for 3 seconds or more, any passive nonwatching would be counted as a view. However, when the ad played
automatically, the average watch time across campaigns was 12.92
percent (range of averages across campaigns = 7.04 – 17.98). This
percentage is 27 seconds of 1 ad, and 19 seconds of the other, which
suggests that even unintentional plays might have grabbed enough
attention for viewers to see what the video was about before clicking
away or stopping the ad. When users clicked our video to play, the
average watch time across campaigns was 31.38 percent (range of
averages across campaigns = 18.09 – 42.60).
A more specific breakdown of watch time by individual ad is listed at the
end of this report.
Facebook Ad Access
More people viewed our ads on an iPhone (261,313 total) than on an
Android smartphone (166,276 total). Although a desktop was the third
most popular device to access our ads, it only accounted for 22,559
people. This compares differently from our campaign in Iraq for which
Android was the predominant device in terms of accessing our videos.
This data is crucial to further adjusting the targeting of our audience in
terms of device and platform use.

ENGAGEMENT METRICS
In the previous section, we presented relevant metrics related to our
video views. Awareness and engagement metrics such as viewer retention
rate (percent watched) and viewer drop off rates are helpful in further
adjusting our awareness campaigns. While the previous section served
to mostly explain quantitative data related to our campaign, engagement
metrics covered in this section offer a clearer indication as to if and how
our Facebook ad resonated with our audience.
Journal of Strategic Security
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Together, the seven Facebook campaigns were responsible for 296,398
ICSVE page engagements, including 349 new ICSVE page likes. In
addition to our directly targeted audience, 16,589 people came across the
ad by “word-of-mouth” (the ad came up in their news feed as something a
friend commented on/reacted to/shared,). Of this group, 1,488 clicked to
visit the ICSVE Facebook page, or to comment on, share, or react to the
ads. This was all simply thanks to the engagement of our initial viewers.
As one user commented, “I don’t like x, but I will share x,” illustrating that
even those disturbed by our content found it important enough to spread.
In total there were:

•

3,302 shares

•

1,079 comments

•

3,247 reactions, including:

o

1,663 likes

o

903 angry reactions

o

561 sad reactions

o

58 wow reactions

o

47 haha reactions

o

22 love reactions

As the qualitative responses to our campaign ad will demonstrate in the
ensuing sections, coupled with the data presented above, our Facebook
ad campaigns have led to a number of emotional responses to our videos.
However, we must be careful not to attribute certain user behavior online,
the 1, 663 likes in our case, for instance, as necessarily an indication of
support for our campaign or videos. In other words, there might be among
those who might have been motivated not by the content of our videos
but rather morbid infatuation, curiosity, or many other factors.
Three of our Facebook ads generated a relevance score of 10, two
generated scores of 9, and two generated relevance scores of eight,
as calculated on a 1-10 scale. The higher the relevance score, the better
in terms of how our audience is responding to our ad. According to
Facebook, “a relevance score is calculated based on the positive and
negative feedback we expect an ad to receive from its target audience.
It denotes both actual feedback and expected feedback. It is calculated
based on a number of factors, such as the positive vs. negative feedback
it is expected to receive. To demonstrate, video views, shares, and likes
to constitute positive indicators, whereas the number of times our ad
https://doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.11.3.1679
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is hidden, or number of times someone clicks “I don’t want to see this”
on our ad, represent negative indicators. Before a relevance score is
generated, our ad must have been served or shown 500 times (for
example, 500 impressions are received). The relevance score is especially
important to better identify our target audiences and use it for our
campaign optimization. That said the relevance score is used to measure
relevance of a campaign and not the quality of campaign. In other words,
it is generated based on interaction and interest in our campaign. Despite
its limitations, it is especially useful in understanding whether our target
audience is considering our campaign and whether it is engaging with
it. Our high relevance scores make clear that we are garnering audience
engagement.
Positive feedback and negative feedback were both reportedly “ high”
(out of the options “low,” “ medium,” or “high”) for every single ad. This
means many people were estimated to interact with our English-speaker
targeted videos, but many people also chose not to view it. This is typical
of all ICSVE ads, especially those that receive higher relevance scores of
8, 9, or 10. We will continue to aim for high relevance scores. That said,
we would continue to reevaluate such scores depending on how well
our campaigns are meeting our objectives of raising awareness about
the dangers of joining ISIS. Moreover, it is not necessary to have high
relevance scores as long as we meet expected campaign objectives of
raising awareness about the dangers of joining ISIS. The following section
contains a qualitative analysis of comments and discussions generated by
our ads.

COMMENTS AND QUALITATIVE IMPACT ANALYSIS
Much of the data presented in the aforementioned sections were analyzed
using descriptive quantitative methods. Comments to the counternarrative videos were analyzed used sentiment analysis technique. While
relatively under-utilized in studies involving Facebook and social media
in general, sentiment analysis proved instrumental in examining the
relationship and association between most recurring themes, as well as
classifying them into certain categories. The data selection and analysis
process in comment section included:
1.

Exporting verbatim comments from the Facebook ad page
and assigning corresponding IDs.

2.
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3.

Examining both manually and through use of sentiment
analysis software (IntenCheck) responses and randomly
reading 15 percent of them to get a sense of the themes that
are likely to emerge.

4.

Sorting out applicable comments and cleaning out unrelated
and repetitive responses.

5.

Coding and sorting out comments into respective
groups

6.

Presenting and discussing data

Below represents a sample IntenCheck software output that monitored
26 different categories (Seven group tones and communicative analysis)
within comment section.
Figure 2. IntenCheck software output.

Table 2

ATTITUDE GROUP
Grade

Value

Words

POSITIVE

Category

LOW

6

102

able, above, acceptable, adequate, advantage,
agreement, appreciation, beautiful, benefit, bett. . .

NEGATIVE

VERY HIGH

100

155

against, allegations, anger, appalled, archaic,
arguments, ashamed, attack, backward, bad, barb. . .

STRONG

VERY LOW

0

133

able, act, adult, advantage, aggressive, agreement,
army, assistance, attack, aware, benefit, b . . .

WEAK

LOW

16

41

admit, apologize, ashamed, bum, common, crawl,
death, depression, desperate, die, disgrace, dis . . .

ACTIVE

VERY LOW

0

125

act, aggressive, alive, anger, argue, ask, assitance,
attack, behavior, bet, better, bols . . .

PASSIVE

VERY LOW

0

117

accept, admit, agreement, allow, appreciation,
ashamed, aware, become, been, being, belief, bel . . .

https://doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.11.3.1679
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Sample Text Output Discussing Anti-ISIS Attitudes Using IntenCheck
Software
“Those ISIS people are worse than any animals in the world. They
are disbeliever and wrong do are. They are Devil or Satan. May
ALLAH (GOD) destroy them or guide them toward right path.
Ameen.” – U.S., Slave Market
“Barbaric savages I wouldn’t piss on them if they was on fire
[expletive] Isis” – UK, Slave Market
“Make sure the [expletive] stay where they are and stew in their
own expletive. Good enough.” – UK, Slave Market
“Brainless cave bastards!” – UK, Slave Market
“Horrible, horrible creatures…”
Sample Text Output Highlighting Negative Attitudes Using IntenCheck
Software
“By this video they try to justify what she has done by showing
her naive but joining a brutal terrorist group by itself is
a crime against humanity. If she was offered what she was
promised, then she was going to continue supporting IS?
No sympathy towards those [expletive] at all” -UK, Promises
Sample Text Output Highlighting Anger Using IntenCheck Software
“COMPLETELY FAKE!! Islam doesn’t promote anything like this.
I am Muslim, I treat my mother, sister, and wife as my queens
and that’s what my holy book, the Quran teaches. As a Muslim I
am against all this and it is obvious people that created this are
further promoting their Islamophobic agenda onto others. Further,
ISIS is to Islam as the KKK are to Christianity, no sane person would
ask a KKK member about Christianity, and same goes with Muslims
to ISIS. They are corrupt sects that spew hate, anger and have
no intent but to create divisions amongst people» – U.S., Slave
Market
Across all seven campaigns, there were 1,079 comments. About half (538)
of these comments came from the UK Slave Market Campaign. Ads, which
targeted Canada, received the least amount of comments for both videos.
Journal of Strategic Security
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However, when accounting for Reach, the ratio of people who saw the ads
to people who commented is roughly the same across campaigns. Overall,
the Slave Market video received more comments than the Promises video.
Below is a more specific breakdown by campaign.
Table 3

UK, Slave Market:
Australia, Slave Market:
U.S., Slave Market:

538 comments (Original: 351, Replies: 187)
~9 comments/10,000 people reached
192 comments (Original: 127, Replies: 65)
~17 comments/10,000 people reached
133 comments (Original: 64, Replies: 69)
~13 comments/10,000 people reached

Canada, Slave Market:

101 comments (Original: 59, Replies: 42)
~14 comments/10,000 people reached

U.S., Promises:

48 comments (Original: 24, Replies: 24)
~8 comments/10,000 people reached

UK, Promises:
Canada, Promises:

37 comments (Original: 25, Replies: 12)
~7 comments/10,000 people reached
30 comments (Original: 20, Replies: 10)
~8 comments/10,000 people reached

Generally, comments fell under three categories: anti-ISIS, anti-Islam, and
defense of Islam. The categories also often overlapped, since commenters
against Islam and commenters in defense of Islam were both anti-ISIS.
Notably, there were no explicit pro-ISIS statements. (This compares
differently to our ICSVE YouTube channel comments in which there are
pro-ISIS statements made much more frequently and where it is possible
to comment anonymously.) However, many commenters attempted
to discredit ICSVE’s videos. They claimed the videos were fake, the
defectors were lying, and/or the videos were propaganda created to
make Islam look bad. Though these comments might have been made by
innocent individuals who felt the need to defend their religion, which they
perceived to be under attack, the comments might also have been from
ISIS supporters trying to discredit our videos. This is discussed in detail
later in the report (see Regional Comment Trends section).
Below are some examples of the three larger categories: anti-ISIS, antiIslam, and defense of Islam comments and opinions.
Anti-ISIS and “Supportive Category” – Comments in Support of the
Video, Characters in the Video, or the Campaign in General
“Those ISIS people are worse than any animals in the world. They
are disbeliever and wrong do are. They are Devil or Satan. May
ALLAH (GOD) destroy them or guide them toward right path.
Ameen.” – US, Slave Market
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“Horrible, horrible creatures! They are evil and treacherous” – UK
Slave Market
“Sick bastards” – UK, Slave Market
“Disgusting behavior and a complete mockery of the Islamic faith if
they think this is acceptable” – UK, Slave Market
“What gives you the rights to take these women and use them as
sexual slaves in a war? You are nothing but animals. You are not
true Muslim people but you give your fellow Muslim people a bad
name” – UK, Slave Market
Anti-Islam and “Misunderstood” Category—Comments Likely Expressing
Negativity Due to Misunderstood Content Featured in the Video
“It’s a problem with Islam, not just ISIS” – US, Promises
“Eradicate Islam!”-Canada, Slave Market
“The true face of Islam” – UK, Slave Market
“Expletive Islam!” – UK, Slave Market
“Don’t you actually really know that Muslims really do use their
children against anyone who opposes them....they strap bombs
etc. on them so opponents have to be extremely cautious....their
children have blown up soldiers in the past as well as themselves.”
– UK, Slave Market
“What the [expletive] are you talking about? THIS IS ISLAM. This is
what they promote. Taking 9-year-old girls as their bride is widely
accepted throughout this disturbed [expletive] up religion. No
Muslim man respects their wife” – UK, Slave Market
*In response to comment separating ISIS from Islam: “Learn to take
criticism…London attack in tube, British parliament knife attack,
Paris attack, Barcelona attack, Dhaka attack, blasts in Syria, Iraq
etc. name it are not committed by Hindus, Jain’s, Buddhist Sikhs, or
by Christian. These are on records.” – UK, Slave Market
“You can see real Islam here” – Australia, Slave Market
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Defense of Islam and “Negative Category” – Comments Expressing Dislike towards the Video, Characters Featured in the Video or the Campaign in General
“This is not Islam. They’re using the religion for their own benefit.” –
US, Slave Market
“[…] there is no evidence that Muslim should kill another person or
make women of their slave.” – Canada, Slave Market
“COMPLETELY FAKE!! Islam doesn’t promote anything like this. I
am Muslim, I treat my mother, sister, and wife as my queens and
that’s what my holy book, the Quran teaches. As a Muslim, I am
against all this and it is obvious people that created this are further
promoting their Islamophobic agenda onto others. Further, ISIS is
to Islam as the KKK are to Christianity, no sane person would ask
a KKK member about Christianity, and same goes with Muslims
to ISIS. They are corrupt sects that spew hate, anger and have
no intent but to create divisions amongst people.” – US, Slave
Market
Female Focused and “Supportive” and “Negative” Category
Due to the focus of each ad – one about female enslavement and the
other about the experience of a female defector – there were also many
female-focused comments. This led to a trend of commenters engaging
in culture wars in the comment section. Many commenters made remarks
about Middle Eastern culture being generally oppressive of women. This
claim was used as a way of explaining how ISIS members were able to
justify their behavior.
“It is not acceptable, and it is archaic and barbaric that anyone in
modern times is subjected to slavery. Those that still participate
in this show themselves to be ignorant and less than human and
as such do not deserve to survive. Cultures, religions and belief
systems that think any subjection of others is acceptable should be
wiped out and do not deserve a place in this world.”
*Response: “Like western pornographers? Lol
*Response: “I think you will find that pornography is
worldwide and prolific in the East and in Asia, and not
confined to the West. Most of it is also consensual with
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payments and choices made. We however in the UK are
dealing with a plethora of Muslim and Asian pedophile rings.
Or I suppose you will deny this exists along with the culture
of marrying off 8-year-old girls! Or the Saudi preference for
young boys.” – UK, Slave Market
“It’s common sense to know that women are treated like gods in
the Middle East.”
*Response: “And they aren’t there? Lol”
*Response: “They won’t be stoned to death for being raped...
use that as a cornerstone for your argument and it gets easier
from there.”
*Response: “Wow since you are compelled to speak what you
have no idea about. Then. So, you are from Kentucky. And you
are in a relationship.”
Several comment trends presented themselves according to video and
region. Today is the Female Slave Market Day in ad-Dawlah and Promises
of ad-Dawlah to Women garnered responses unique to their respective
content, and some commenters had slightly different things to say
depending on the social and political goings-on of the countries from
whence they responded.
Comment Trends Specific to the Today is the Female Slave Market Day in
ad-Dawlah video
The Slave Market ad provoked more disagreements and more emotionally
charged language (mostly anger and disgust) than the Promises ad. In
keeping with the female-focused comments, there was a small trend
of commenters pointing out feminisms, particularly western feminism’s
alleged failure to recognize or help the women who’d been enslaved by
ISIS. The International Center for the Study of Violent Extremism (ICSVE)
researchers noticed this trend last year as well when the same videos
were shown to other English speakers, and some French speakers.
Examples:
“Where’s the feminists fighting for these girl’s equality?” –
Australia, Slave Market
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“Why aren’t all these feminists crying out about this instead
of claiming sexual harassment every time a man looks in their
direction” – UK, Slave Market
Additionally, many commenters were confused and upset by the fact
that the defector emphasized the religion of the enslaved women. To
the viewers, it appeared the defector used women’s Islamic status as
the determining factor in whether mass rape and enslavement was
acceptable. Commenters therefore concluded this meant the defector was
fine with enslaving non-Muslim women.
“Negative Category” – Comments Expressing Dislike towards the Video,
Characters Featured in the Video or the Campaign in General
“The guy seemed more upset that it was MUSLIM women being
sold into slavery. I’m sure if it was some Christian or Jewish
[expletive] he would have found that halal. What a disgusting
ideology.” – Canada, Slave Market
“So... No one has a problem with them enslaving Jewish and
Christian sex slaves... just the Muslims. I have no words.” – U.S.,
Slave Market
“He is questioning if Muslim women can be taken as slaves, if she’s
non-Muslim, it’s cool though” – Canada, Slave Market
“Well he seemed to only have an issue with Muslim women being
sex slaves. Not just because sex slaves in general is wrong. Wtf?
Seriously?” – Australia, Slave Market
“He seemed only concerned that they were Muslim women. That’s
troubling also. Nobody should be sold as a Slave. Sex or labor.” –
Canada, Slave Market
“Notice he’s only if saying [sic] it’s not ok to have “Muslim women”
as slaves. He doesn’t refer to all women in general.” – U.S., Slave
Market
“I like how it was that they were Muslims he took issue with. It
wasn’t that they were enslaving people. No, he felt bad only
because they were Muslims.” – Canada, Slave Market
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“Supportive Category”—Comments in Support of the Video, Characters
in the Video, or the Campaign in General
“I just love how this guy telling the story proves that they don’t
all believe this is the way of life “this isn’t right –Australia,” Slave
Market
Comment Trends Specific to the Promises of Ad-Dawlah to Women Video
While the Promises ad also provoked some arguments in the comment
section, most commenters agreed that the subject of the video – Laura
Passoni – was in their opinions: unintelligent, laughable, and to be shown
no sympathy. This was by far the greatest trend specific to this video.
“Negative Category”—comments expressing dislike towards the video,
characters featured in the video or the campaign in general
“That’s what you get for joining a terrorist organization, no
sympathy whatsoever” – UK, Promises
“Traitor.” – Canada, Promises
“Oh, come on. My boyfriend dumped me, so my next logical step is
to join ISIS?” – Canada Promises
“Hard to have sympathy for a moron.” – Canada, Promises
“What a [expletive] moron.” – U.S., Promises
“This woman is a lying piece of expletive! Trying to gain sympathy
because she was caught out, she should receive a bullet to the
head along with anyone else who returns from Syria/Iraq etc.” –
UK, Promises
“By this video they try to justify what she has done by showing her
naive but joining a brutal terrorist group by itself is a crime against
humanity. If she was offered what she was promised, then she
was going to continue supporting IS? No sympathy towards those
beaches at all
.” – UK, Promises
“Why is she not in prison with [her husband]?” – Canada,
Promises
There were some comments expressing sympathy or understanding.
However, while there were more sympathetic comments for Laura than
for the male defector in the Slave Market video, they were still sparse.
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“Supportive Category”—Comments in Support of the Video, Characters
in the Video, or the Campaign in General
*In response to someone insulting the defector’s
intelligence:
“What part did you not understand when she said she was
depressed and vulnerable?????” – Canada, Promises
“I feel what she saying let her man do four years get out and prove
everybody wrong life’s f***** up a f*****-up Journey at times.... I
believe her. we’ve all made f*****-up decisions in life...”S – U.S.,
Promises
Why Do the Two Videos Receive Different Reactions?
First, each video has a different focus. In Promises of Ad-Dawlah to
Women, the defector spoke primarily of her own mistreatment by ISIS.
Furthermore, her most emphasized suffering was because of being misled.
In Today is the Female Slave Market in Ad-Dawlah, the defector discussed
the mistreatment of slave women by ISIS, and the emphasis was on sexual
enslavement – a circumstance graver and more graphic than what was
discussed in Promises.
Second, each defector’s gender, ethnicity, and nationality must be taken
into consideration. The defector in the Slave Market video was a Syrian
(Arab) male. His ethnicity might have made it easier for the audience to
view him as a representation of all Middle Eastern people and, therefore,
Middle Eastern culture. Likewise, his gender (male) might have made it
easier for the audience to view him as predatory or aggressive.
However, since the defector in the Promises video is a female, it might
have been easier to perceive her as a “stupid” or “vulnerable” individual
who was taken advantage of rather than mal-intended. Since these videos
targeted the Western world (Australia included), Laura being white and
European might have also prompted some cognitive dissonance in the
viewers; it would be less upsetting to think of her as an unintelligent
exception to – as opposed to a representation of – the population to
which the audience otherwise belongs.
Regional Comment Trends
Both ICSVE videos were called propaganda by viewers across regions, but
the UK dominated this trend overall. One possible reason for this is that
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Muslims make up a greater percentage of the overall population in the
UK (territories targeted) than in the US, Canada, or Australia. Arguably,
Europe is also much closer to the Middle East and ISIS. Many propagandafocused comments accused the videos of being intentional marketing
against Islam, rather than against ISIS. This is contrary to ICSVE’s objective
of separating Islam from ISIS (hence the counter-narrative emphasis).
This may also represent deep sensitivity among UK Muslims who have
been subjected to UK Prevent policies for over a decade now as well
as responses to videos made by Research Information Communication
Unit (RICU) but thinly disguised as other entities productions which may
make UK Muslims feel suspicious of counter-messaging and feel at times
that they and their religion are under undue scrutiny and even attack.
It is actually for this reason that ICSVE researchers decided early on to
clearly brand their videos so there is no question of who the authors and
sponsors of the messages are being put forward.
Such sentiments could also be attributed to the fact that most did not
watch the videos to the end, therefore missing the message that ISIS is
warping and abusing Islam and selling lies. Despite the defectors both
saying ISIS was not practicing true Islam, viewers took to the comments
to tell others not to believe the video. However, as mentioned, it is unclear
whether these comments were made by innocents or by ISIS supporters
trying to discredit ICSVE material. It would behoove ISIS recruiters to
further the narrative that Western entities are trying to eradicate Islam by
making the religion look bad, and to insist ICSVE videos are full of lies. If
this is the case, ICSVE ads have successfully reached some of their target
audience.
“Negative Category”—Comments Expressing Dislike towards the Video,
Characters Featured in the Video or the Campaign in General
“Do not believe this propaganda bought and paid for by the west!
No Muslim would EVER condone this!” – UK, Slave Market
“A liar lies a lie. Lie lie lie” – UK, Slave Market
“Why was this video created and who is behind it? If we find out
we would know the motives of supporting such a criminal like her
making her look innocent.” – UK, Promises
“Why the expletive is this propaganda trash on my Facebook
feed?” – Canada, Slave Market
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The Canadian campaigns had a trend of comments criticizing Canadian
Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, who pulled Canada out of the airstrike
mission against ISIS, and is outspoken in his support and welcoming of
Syrian war refugees.
Below are examples of comments against Trudeau:
“Keep the pieces of expletive in their own country and send
Trudeau and his bum buddies there also” – Canada, Slave
Market
*In response to a meme of Justin Trudeau: “By the way, he sell
arms to Saudi Arabia in billions, which is given to ISIS, and used to
bomb children’s of Yemen, the money is brought to Canada, the
act was done by your great grandfathers with the indigenous and
still doing it, you all are British refugees, so shut up, and stop giving
arms and ammunitions to Saudi and Israeli regimes to create such
monsters” – Canada, Slave Market
“And Trudo wants to give these animals a hug.” – Canada, Slave
Market
“Hope every single one of those disgusting enslaving piles of
expletive end up dying slowly and painfully and expletive Trudeau
for accepting /rewarding this culture/ideology it makes me sick
and filled with pity for those poor girls I can only hope some of
them will taste real freedom asap.” – Canada, Slave Market
Additionally, the UK and Canada both presented a trend of comments
expressing concern that Islam/ISIS/refugees were plaguing their
countries. This was expressed as either fear that Muslims were going to
take over, or frustration that they already had. The reason this, arguably,
is not so much a trend for the US is likely because President Trump is
conservative in his positions on refugees and immigrants, so much so
that he proposed both the travel ban and “the wall.” In fact, some UK
Facebook commenters even commended Trump. The reason this is not so
much a trend for Australia is likely because Australia is farther away from
the Middle East, and because Australia was the only region to be targeted
with one video instead of two (therefore receiving only half as many
opportunities for comments).
Examples:
*Sarcastically: “Truly beautiful part of a multicultural and diverse
society I love it diversity is our greatest strength, and this is an
insight into Europe in the next 30 years can’t wait”– UK, Slave
Market
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“And these are the people being welcomed into Europe” – UK,
Slave Market
“Oh, great be Happening in England soon. There already walking
about in England with bedsheets on there head . Same thing
really.” – UK, Slave Market
“Our [expletive] politicians welcome these vermin with open
arms hope DTRUMP tweets this then people will see what Islam’s
about and our borders will close quicker than they do.” – UK, Slave
Market
Noteworthy Comments
Lastly, there were some comments that stood out as being sympathetic
in terms of trying to understand either the defectors or other commenters
with different viewpoints by respectfully asking questions. They were a
rare contrast to the majority of comments or conversations, which were
filled with arguments, hatred, fear, defensiveness, shock, and disbelief.
“Supportive Category” – Comments in Support of the Video, Characters
in the Video, or the Campaign in General
“We are British yes? Our nation’s army has done some terrible
things, but we cannot say all British people are like that right? The
crewmembers that did those things, claim to have done those
things for survival right? Just like Libya, these are war torn nations
and it is impossible for me to comprehend the things these guys
are going through to make them react like this, there for I reserve
judgment. I will Say this though, what all these war-torn nations
have in common is the fact that our leaders have not provided
adequate assistance to help them rebuild, there for again I say how
do we cause the problem and then judge the people in the very
problem which we, or our leaders rather, created?” – UK, Slave
Market
“Naive and not educated because I really don’t get it how she
could believe that she was going to have a better life in a country
in war. Even for guys that join Isis I really don’t understand it . What
is the reason? What is the purpose?” – U.S., Promises
“For all the white people out there, here you go. Especially Britain
first you bastards!”
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*Response: “Trust me, white people understand they are not
the standard. It’s not us vs you, it’s us against extremism of all
forms”
*Response: “you’re a good lad, you’re an exception. I’m on
about the rest that think Isis are Muslims.”
*Response: “Well said both of yours” – UK, Slave Market

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Similar to other awareness and brand raising campaigns, the purpose
of our small-scale Facebook ad awareness campaigns was to shed light
on dangers associated with joining terrorist groups like ISIS, as well as
protect vulnerable potential recruits inside the United States, UK, Canada,
and Australia from considering joining. Two ICSVE-produced videos were
used in the campaigns, namely The Promises of ad-Dawlah to Women,
which featured the testimony of a Belgian female ISIS defector, and Today
is the Female Slave Market in ad-Dawlah, which featured a Syrian male ISIS
defector who witnessed the sexual enslavement of women by ISIS. Our
Facebook ad campaigns generated a reach of 1,048,133, with 604K video
views.
In analyzing our data, we have attempted to apply a combination of
awareness, engagement, and impact analysis metrics to discern the extent
to which our interventions achieved its desired effect. As indicated in the
paper, many discussed the message and the messaging strategy of our
counter-narratives, as well as challenged extremist narratives of violent
extremist groups like ISIS. Given the amount of comments generated and
the fact that there are no established “best practices” in collecting and
analyzing social media generated data, we decided to group them into
certain categories and illustrate directly (select few) the nature of each.
We were able to find and present evidence that our viewers have
thoughtfully engaged with the content of our videos, including initiated
debates on women, role of gender in Islam, and other contentious sociopolitical issues that often influence and drive violent extremism. That
said, the results generated represent a short-term measurement of the
impact of our videos and only allow us to utilize such data to further
improve our future targeting campaigns, namely by gaining an increased
understanding of user behavior on Facebook and other social media
platforms.
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Although we can observe engagement with our counter-narratives, it is
far more difficult to observe or report any direct cognitive shifts among
those who support violent extremist ideologies. In discussing the role and
effectiveness of counter-narratives in fighting violent extremism, some
authors have observed, “It is possible that some of these counter-narrative
videos have managed to dissuade individuals from joining or supporting
extremist groups, but those users are simply not leaving comments like,
“Great video, really changed my mind! That said, we hope that may in
fact be occurring. The opinions and comments expressed in the campaign
suggest the need to further expand our internet ad campaign and engage
especially with those who may be willing to act as influencers and magnify
the impact of our counternarratives.
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